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In this paper, I examine the role of household income in determining who bribes and how much they
bribe in health care in Peru and Uganda. I find that rich patients are more likely than other patients
to bribe in public health care: doubling household consumption increases the bribery probability by
0.2-0.4 percentage points in Peru, compared to a bribery rate of 0.8%; doubling household expenditure
in Uganda increases the bribery probability by 1.2 percentage points compared to a bribery rate of
17%. The income elasticity of the bribe amount cannot be precisely estimated in Peru, but is about
0.37 in Uganda. Bribes in the Ugandan public sector appear to be fees-for-service extorted from the
richer patients amongst those exempted by government policy from paying the official fees. Bribes
in the private sector appear to be flat-rate fees paid by patients who do not pay official fees.  I do not
find evidence that the public health care sector in either Peru or Uganda is able to price-discriminate
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jennifer.hunt@mcgill.caThe empirical literature on corruption has identiﬁed consequences of corruption for
countries, such as lower growth and foreign direct investment,1 and causes of corruption
across countries, such as the legal, political and ﬁscal systems.2 It has made progress
in suggesting remedies for corruption: some papers infer corrupt practices in particular
industries, and examine how rule changes or audits aﬀect business practices.3 In this
paper, I contribute to a nascent empirical literature that seeks to understand bilateral
interactions between public oﬃcials and clients as a stepping stone to devising policy.4 I
do so by studying bribery in health care in Peru and Uganda, with particular emphasis
on the role of household permanent income in determining who bribes and how much.
In earlier work, Hunt and Laszlo (2007) analyzed bribery mechanisms for samples
pooling all institutions in Uganda and Peru, and found similar results for the two countries.
The health sector is worthy of separate study for several reasons. First, mechanisms
could diﬀer across institutions, and diﬀerent mechanisms may require diﬀerent solutions.
Unlike many public institutions, the public health care system has competition from the
private sector, which could inﬂuence bribery mechanisms. Second, the health sector is
one where equitable access, and hence the link between permanent income and bribery, is
of particular concern. Third, this is a sector where diﬀerences between Peru and Uganda
might be expected, as health care is relatively free of bribery in Peru, while it has a
bribery rate close to average for the public sector in Uganda. Fourth, for Uganda, a
comparison between bribery in the public and private health care systems may be made.5
Finally, the data for both countries allow a richer set of covariates to be used in the
study of health care than could be used with other institutions. The comparison of Peru
and Uganda is instructive because Peru is a middle–ranking country in Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, with a GNI per capita of US$5,830, while
1Mauro (1995), Wei (2000).
2Fisman and Gatti (2002), Treisman (2000).
3DiTella and Schargrodsky (2003), Ferraz and Finan (2005a,b), Olken (2005, 2006), Yang (2005, 2006).
4See also Kaufmann and Wei (1999) and Svensson (2003) for ﬁrms, and Deininger and Mpuga (2004)
and Thompson and Xavier (2004) for individuals.
5Corruption is not by deﬁnition conﬁned to the public sector: see Gambetta (2002).
1Uganda is classiﬁed as one of the most corrupt countries by TI and has a GNI per capita
of only US$1,500.6
Theory suggests that richer clients should be more likely to bribe a public oﬃcial, and
should pay more conditional on bribing. This stems from the oﬃcial’s possessing a degree
of monopoly power, and hence the ability to price–discriminate amongst customers. If
such discrimination is observed, it could reﬂect ﬁrst–degree price discrimination, or, if the
exact service being paid for by the client cannot be observed, third–degree price discrimi-
nation (the rich pay more and get more). Greater competition between service providers,
whether private or public, should reduce the ability of oﬃcials to price discriminate, and
indeed, under perfect competition bribe amounts should be bid down to zero. Lewis
(2006) has proposed that infrequent bribery in health care in certain countries, including
Peru, is explained by the presence of private sector competition in those countries.
As expected, I ﬁnd that rich patients are more likely than other patients to bribe in
public health care: doubling household consumption increases the bribery probability by
0.2–0.4 percentage points in Peru, compared to a bribery rate of 0.8%; doubling house-
hold expenditure in Uganda increases the bribery probability by 1.2 percentage points
compared to a bribery rate of 17%. The absolute eﬀect is therefore larger in Uganda,
but the percent eﬀect is larger in Peru. More intriguing is the fact that the probability
of bribing in the Ugandan private sector is unrelated to household expenditure. The in-
come elasticity of the bribe amount cannot be precisely estimated in Peru, but is about
0.37 in the public sector in Uganda: the rich pay more, but pay a smaller share of their
expenditure. This elasticity is the same as that for oﬃcial payments in both the public
and the private sector. This could be a coincidence, or could indicate that in all three
cases the elasticity is determined by the same combination of fee–for–service (and the
rich demanding more expensive services) and price–discrimination. Private sector bribe
amounts are determined diﬀerently, since the income (expenditure) elasticity is only 0.15.
Although in Peru, particularly, bribery rates and amounts are lower in health care
6Perceptions from Transparency International (2004a). Purchasing power parity Gross National In-
come from siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf.
2than in other public institutions, I do not ﬁnd evidence that the public health care system
in either Peru or Uganda is able to price–discriminate less eﬀectively than other public
institutions. This somewhat crude test of whether competition reduces bribery therefore
fails to support the hypothesis.
Bribes in the Ugandan public sector are disproportionately paid by the richer patients
amongst those not paying oﬃcial fees. The results, combined with anecdotal evidence,
suggest that much public sector bribery represents a facility–level extortion policy to
raise revenue from patients exempted from payment by government policy. Bribes in
the private sector are ﬂat–rate fees paid almost exclusively by patients not paying oﬃcial
fees. It is unclear whether private patients pay voluntarily to avoid oﬃcial fees, or whether
exempted patients are extorted to raise revenue as in the public sector.
1 Health, Health Care and Corruption in Peru and
Uganda
1.1 Health and Health Care
As would be expected given the diﬀerences in economic development, health outcomes
and health care quality are very diﬀerent in Peru and Uganda. Table 1 shows that life
expectancy at birth is more than twenty years higher in Peru than Uganda. Peru has
1.17 doctors per thousand population, compared to 0.08 for Uganda, although the two
countries have a very similar ratio of nurses to population. Health spending represents
a larger share of GDP in Uganda, but government health spending is a smaller share of
total health spending in Uganda than in Peru (20% compared to 48%). In 2000 there
were 1,226 public, 465 NGO and 49 private (non–NGO) health facilities in Uganda.7 In
Peru, the public sector accounts for 51% of hospitals, 69% of health centers and 99% of
7Uganda Investment Authority www.ugandainvest.com/health.htm. Reinikka and Svensson (2005)
outline the post–colonial history of private and public health care in Uganda.
3health posts.8
My Peruvian data, described below, indicate that for people of all ages, 44% have
some type of health insurance (children are much more likely than adults to be insured,
thanks to subsidized insurance), whereas in Uganda health insurance is essentially non–
existent.9 At least in the early days of the Peruvian insurance expansion, poor uninsured
patients beneﬁted from reduced fees or exemptions from fees.10 In Uganda during the
period relevant for my data, health care at public facilities below the hospital level was
free, while in public hospitals fees were based on the patient’s ability to pay.11 Although
NGO and mission hospitals also make provision for fee exemptions for the poor, Amone et
al. (2005) observe that in their sample of Catholic hospitals, only a minority of exempted
patients were poor (the others were predominantly hospital and church staﬀ, and teachers
and pupils of the Catholic school). Most of these hospitals charged on a fee–for–service
basis (each service had an associated fee), with the exception of treatment for tubercu-
losis and sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS, which was funded by the
government.12
1.2 Corruption in Health Care
Complaints about corruption in hospitals in Peru include staﬀ charging patients more
than oﬃcial prices and pocketing the diﬀerence, collusion between hospital staﬀ and ex-
ternal pharmacies or external providers of medical tests, high absenteeism on the part of
doctors with a second job in the private sector, doctors referring patients to their private
practice, and bribes of money or sex to obtain jobs.13 Concerning corruption that would
8Pan–American Health Organization www.paho.org/English/DD/AIS/cp 604.htm undated, accessed
18 January 2007.
9Valdivia (2002) describes Peruvian insurance for children and the poor; Per´ ez and Lenz (2006) de-
scribe this and the organization of the health system more generally.
10Cotlear (2000).
11Nabyonga et al. (2005).
12See also Uganda Ministry of Health Online (2000) at www.health.go.ug/budget.htm.
13lincolnmaylleantaurco.blogspot.com/2006 03 01 lincolnmaylleantaurco archive.html, Alc´ azar and
Andrade (2001), Webb and Valencia (2006).
4involve explicit bribes by patients, patients bribe to advance on hospital waiting lists, and
hospitalized patients bribe to obtain the attention of medical staﬀ, particularly a consul-
tation with the doctor, and to have surgery.14 Many payments appear to inhabit a grey
area between bribes and oﬃcial payments. Hospitals or groups of professionals within
the hospital raise poorly documented revenue that they keep, rather than remitting to
the central authorities, some of which is used to top up doctor salaries in violation of
oﬃcial policy. This revenue comes in part from fees for medicines, medical supplies and
laboratory tests. Social workers charge poor patients for evaluations as to their eligibility
for exemptions from fees, and charge for the certiﬁcate of exemption.15
As part of the collection of the Ugandan data, described below, the consulting company
commissioned by the government ran focus groups on bribery and availability of public
services in 180 villages. Almost every focus group notes that medical attention at public
hospitals and health units can only be obtained in exchange for payment despite the
oﬃcial abolition of user fees at health units. They state that patients have to bribe to
attract the attention of medical staﬀ and pay for all medical supplies, no matter how
small.16 The impression conveyed by the focus groups is less one of individual bad apples
within a particular facility than of facility–wide policies to extort bribes.
Focus group participants complain that the only drug available at Ugandan health
facilities is Panadol (Tylenol). Other drugs must be purchased at pharmacies, drug shops
or private practices with connections to the doctor recommending the drug, despite the
fact that they should be available free in the public health units.17 Some groups note
that the corruption and poor service in the public health sector lead people to use private
clinics, despite their cost.
It is possible that the abolition of Ugandan user fees shortly before my study period
led health workers to extract more bribes as a way of allocating scarce resources and
14Lorena Alc´ azar, personal communcation.
15Webb and Valencia (2006).
16Jitta et al. (2003) observe that patients routinely bring their own syringes and must pay for the
liquids used to mix the injection ﬂuid.
17The respondents in Jitta et al. (2003) make the same observation.
5raising revenue. Nevertheless, accounts of the health care system in periods where user
fees existed describe widespread corruption similar to that deplored by the 2002 focus
groups.18 Based on a mixed of quantitative and qualitative data from a period when user
fees were becoming more widespread, McPake et al. (1999) conclude that there is some
evidence that introducing oﬃcial fees reduced bribery. They also quantify claims of the




I use the 2002 and 2003 waves of the Peruvian household surveys, the Encuesta Nacional
de Hogares (ENAHO), conducted yearly by Peru’s national statistical agency, the In-
stituto Nacional de Estad´ ıstica e Informaci´ on. The surveys, for which rural regions are
oversampled, have more than 18,000 respondent households per year. Beginning in 2002,
the agency included a governance module with questions on the use and bribery of public
oﬃcials.19 One randomly chosen adult per household is asked numerous questions per-
taining to the household’s use of 21 diﬀerent types of oﬃcials or institutions: the relevant
one for this paper is state hospitals. If a particular type of oﬃcial was used in the previous
twelve months, then respondents are asked a series of questions in connection with use of
this oﬃcial type in this time–frame, and possible bribery: whether the oﬃcial asked for a
bribe, gift, tip or “coima” (slang for bribe), whether the respondent felt obliged to bribe,
bribed voluntarily, or refused to bribe, and the amount of the bribe if she bribed.
The health module of the survey asks each adult (and an adult proxy for children)
questions about their health and hospital use in the previous twelve months, as well as
more detailed questions about the previous three months and four weeks. I also use
responses to questions in the bribery module about ill fortune the household has met
18For example, Konde–Lule and Okello (1998).
19However, beginning in 2004 the agency stopped releasing this module with the rest of the data.
6with in the previous twelve months, especially whether someone in the household had
had an accident or had been seriously ill. I also identify households with babies born in
the previous twelve months. The Data Appendix provides further information.
2.2 Uganda
I use information on the 12,000 household respondents to the Ugandan Second National
Integrity Survey, which over–sampled urban areas. The Ugandan government commis-
sioned a consulting company to conduct this survey in 2002. All questions are asked of the
household head or spouse. The core of the survey has a similar structure to the Peruvian
bribery section, with a series of questions on usage, bribery, and service quality posed for
each of 21 types of oﬃcial or institution. However, in this paper I focus on the module
devoted to bribery in the health sector. A series of questions is asked about the most
recent health care visit of a household member in the last three months. Information
gathered about this visit includes the type of facility, whether it was public or private,
the age of the patient and the nature of her ailment, whether the visit was part of a
longer treatment, the amount of oﬃcial payments and the amount of unoﬃcial payments
(which I call bribes), and qualitative questions about the quality and cost of treatment.
A disadvantage of using the health module is that, unlike in the main bribery module,
the respondent is not asked if s/he received a receipt for payment.
There are fewer non–corruption variables in this survey than in the Peruvian surveys,
and missing values, zeroes and not applicable responses cannot always be distinguished.
Household expenditure is elicited through six questions pertaining to the previous week,
and three questions pertaining to the previous month, and is hence rather crudely mea-
sured. The question on bribe payments does not seem designed to elicit the value of
in–kind payments. The Data Appendix provides further information.
72.3 Samples and descriptive statistics
I restrict my analysis to households who report using the health care system in the relevant
time frame. For Uganda, this means those reporting usage in the health bribery module.
For Peru, this means those who report using state hospitals in the bribery module, since
it is only for them that bribery information is available.
A comparison of responses to the Peruvian health and bribery modules reveals that
a considerable number of individuals who used state hospitals did not have this usage
reported in the bribery survey by their household’s respondent. The extent of underre-
porting decreased greatly in 2003 in most, but not all, regions, suggesting that survey–
takers in most regions attempted to reduce the discrepancy between the modules in 2003.
For example, in 2002 only 45% of the individuals who said they had been hospitalized in
the main type of public hospital, MINSA, were in households whose respondent reported
usage of public hospitals in the bribery module. This number rose to 73% in 2003. To
account for diﬀering selection into the sample by region and year, I include 24 regional in-
dicators interacted with a dummy for the 2003 survey in all regressions. I do not attempt
to deal with the fundamental selection problem, however.
Table 2 shows that 12,262 of 36,000 Peruvian households reported using state hospitals
(in the bribery module), and of these 0.8% reported paying or refusing to pay a bribe
(a bribery “episode”), below the 2.3% bribery rate for users of all 21 oﬃcial types. The
number of bribery episodes in the sample is therefore only 95. Average household monthly
consumption is US$339, but households with a bribery episode are richer, at US$385. The
table also shows the shares of households who had suﬀered a misfortune, such as a serious
illness or accident of one of its members, and shows such victims are over–represented
amongst households with a bribery episode. The average bribe for bribers was US$9.10,
which is below the (unreported) average bribe across all institutions of $20. The lower
than average bribery rate and amount are consistent with reduced corruption in health
care through competition with the private sector.
Table 3 shows means of variables from the Peruvian health module for the same sample.
8The means are of responses to questions asked of all respondents, and the values are for the
respondent to the bribery module. When these variables are used as covariates in bribery
regressions, the matching will introduce measurement error, as the bribery respondent
is not necessarily the household member whose visit led to the behavior reported in the
bribery module. Three quarters of respondents have no health insurance and a quarter
have a chronic health condition, and both groups are over–represented amongst households
with a bribery episode. The 9% of people hospitalized in the previous twelve months
represent 18% of households with a bribery episode. The other variables refer to windows
of less than twelve months, which means that they can control only imperfectly for events
in the twelve month window relevant for bribery.
I present means of further health module variables in Table 4. The questionnaire asks
about symptoms in the previous four weeks, and if symptoms are present asks about
care sought in response to these symptoms. If the level of care sought was suﬃciently
sophisticated, questions are asked about the type of professional the respondent saw and
the types of tests she underwent. Additional Peruvian means are given in Appendix
Table 1.
I analyze Ugandan patients in the public sector and the private sector separately.
Column 1 of Table 5 shows that the 17% bribery rate for the public sector (panel A) is
an order of magnitude larger than the Peruvian rate (0.8%) despite being based on the
most recent visit in the past three months, rather than on all visits in the previous twelve
months.20 Panel B considers patients of Ugandan public hospitals, to make the sample
comparable to the Peruvian sample, but the bribery rate is similar to the overall public
rate, at 19%. The private bribery rate is lower, at 11% (panel C). In column 2 I show the
share of patients who made oﬃcial payments: 38% of public patients do so, but almost all
private patients (83%) do so. The amount of the bribes averaged US$6.06 in the public
sector, US$7.88 in public hospitals and is lower at US$5.26 in the private sector. Oﬃcial
payments, for those paying, are likewise highest at public hospitals, at US$15.81. For
20The three–month rate in the Ugandan health bribery module is more than half the six–month rate
in the Ugandan main bribery module, however.
9the public sector, the bribery rate is slightly below the bribery rate for all institutions
together (20%) and the bribe amount is also lower compared to the average bribe of $13.
This could be a sign that competition from the private sector reduces corruption in public
health care, although the diﬀerence is less pronounced than for Peru.
Table 6 contains the means of variables from the Ugandan health module (additional
means are in Appendix Tables 2 and 3). Uganda is much poorer than Peru, and patients
of the public sector (columns 1 and 2) are slightly poorer than patients of the private
sector (columns 3 and 4). Public sector patients who did not bribe had only US$82 in
monthly household expenditure, while public sector bribers had higher expenditure at
US$91. Private sector bribers are not richer than other private sector patients. In each
column, at least 62% of patients suﬀered from malaria/fever/headache. Slightly more than
half of public patients visited a hospital, while this share was low for private patients:
14% for non–bribers and 6% for bribers (though private clinics perform many functions
of a hospital).
3 Estimation
My ﬁrst outcome of interest is the probability that household i bribes conditional on using
the health system, P(B|U). I estimate
P(B|U)i = β0 + β1Wi + β2Xi + i, (1)
where Wi is household consumption (Peru) or expenditure (Uganda), and Xi are other
covariates. I estimate this using a probit for Uganda and linear probability for Peru,
where the small number of bribes and the large number of categorical covariates makes
estimation by probit diﬃcult.
My second outcome of interest is the amount of the bribe A. Using the sample of
bribes, I estimate
logAi = β3 + β4Wi + β5Xi + ηi. (2)
For Uganda, I estimate both equations separately for users of the private and public
10health systems. In order to allow a comparison of how oﬃcial and unoﬃcial payments work
to allocate resources, I also compare the Ugandan results when the dependent variable is
oﬃcial payments, rather than bribes.21 Because Ugandan expenditure is measured quite
crudely, I expect some bias towards zero in the Ugandan estimates of β1 and β4. In all
cases, the standard errors are clustered at the level of the smallest region in the data.
Because of the oversampling of rural areas in Peru, and the oversampling of urban areas
in Uganda, all Peruvian speciﬁcations control for region (interacted with a 2003 dummy)
and city size, and all Ugandan speciﬁcations control for district and urban location. All
Peruvian speciﬁcations also control for household size dummies, time to the district ad-
ministrative center and a dummy for the 2003 survey. All Ugandan speciﬁcations control
for household size dummies.
4 Results
4.1 Probability of bribing
Table 7 presents coeﬃcients from linear probability regressions for the probability of
bribing at state hospitals in Peru. The ﬁrst column contains only the basic covariates;
additional non–medical covariates are added in columns 2 and 3; and the medical covari-
ates are gradually added in columns 4–6. The covariates do not aﬀect the coeﬃcient on
consumption greatly: it ranges from 0.0051–0.0063. This implies that were consumption
doubled, the probability of a bribery episode would rise between 0.35 percentage points
(0.0051*log(2)) and 0.43 percentage points. These are small eﬀects absolutely, but are
large compared to the overall bribery rate of 0.8%. For speciﬁcations with fewer covari-
ates, probits can be run. The unreported marginal eﬀect is about 0.0036 (a doubling of
expenditure implying a 0.25 percentage point increase in bribery), within the 95% conﬁ-
dence interval of the linear probability eﬀects. The marginal eﬀects for all oﬃcials pooled
in Hunt and Laszlo (2007) were lower at 0.0025–0.0028, which means the hypothesis that
21This could in principle also be done for Peru, but the presence of insurance complicates the analysis
of oﬃcial payments.
11expenditure plays a lower role in health care bribery because of private sector competition
is not supported.
The equivalent regressions for Uganda are presented in panel A of Table 8. Columns 1–
3 contain marginal eﬀects from probits for patients in the public sector. The preferred
marginal eﬀect of 0.017, with the full covariates in column 3, implies that a doubling
of expenditure increases the bribery probability by 1.2 percentage points. This is much
larger than the percentage point eﬀect for Peru, but is smaller than for Peru compared
to the overall bribery probability, which for the Ugandan public sector is 17%. The
Ugandan eﬀect is probably more attenuated by measurement error than the Peruvian
eﬀect, however. Unreported eﬀects for public hospitals are very similar to eﬀects for the
public health sector as a whole. The eﬀects are similar to point estimates of 0.011–0.018 for
all oﬃcials pooled in Hunt and Laszlo (2007). There is again no evidence that competition
in health care reduces the role of expenditure in determining bribery. In contrast to the
public sector, there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of expenditure on the probability of bribing in
the private sector, in the linear probability regressions of columns 4–6 (nor in unreported
probit counterparts with fewer covariates).
Hunt and Laszlo (2007) reported that lower–expenditure Ugandan patients were more
likely than richer patients to pay what they considered to be oﬃcial payments, but receive
no receipt. If these are unwitting bribes, it means that their omission leads the role of
expenditure in paying a bribe to be overstated. These unwitting bribes cannot be iden-
tiﬁed in the health module, but I have examined their relation to household expenditure
in the main bribery module for health care alone. The unreported results show a positive
but insigniﬁcant relation between expenditure and the payment of unwitting bribes, sug-
gesting that their omission does not bias the health care bribery results as much as was
the case for all oﬃcials pooled in Hunt and Laszlo (2007).22
I investigate the link between expenditure and the probability of an oﬃcial payment
in panel B of Table 8. In the public sector, the marginal eﬀect of 0.043 in column 3
22This check is not perfect, as in the main bribery module the private and public sectors cannot be
distinguished.
12implies that a doubling of consumption increases the probability of making an oﬃcial
payment by 3.0 percentage points, compared to a mean payment rate of 38%. The absolute
eﬀect is larger than for bribes, while the percent eﬀect is similar. The positive eﬀect is
not a surprise, as there are exemptions from payment for the poor, and the rich may
demand more of the services which are not free. By comparison, Hunt and Laszlo (2007)
found a smaller marginal eﬀect of 0.022 for all oﬃcials pooled.23 There is no signiﬁcant
link between expenditure and oﬃcial payment probability in the private sector, where
most people make oﬃcial payments (83%), although the point estimate is 0.01 (panel B,
columns 4–6). This is consistent with the observation of Amone et al. (2005) that patients
exempted at Catholic hospitals are typically not poor.
The patients paying bribes and the patients making oﬃcial payments are to a large
degree diﬀerent people, as Table 9 indicates. In the public sector, while 22% of those
making no oﬃcial payment bribe, only 8% of those making an oﬃcial payment bribe,
and 81% of bribes are paid by patients not making an oﬃcial payment. The contrast is
even greater in the private sector: fully 55% of the small number of patients making no
oﬃcial payment bribe, while only 2% of patients who make an oﬃcial payment bribe, and
83% of bribes are paid by patients not making an oﬃcial payment. The strong negative
correlation between paying bribes and making oﬃcial payments holds up for both sectors
in regressions with the controls used in Table 8. When the bribery regressions of panel A
in Table 8 are repeated for samples of patients not paying oﬃcial fees, the marginal eﬀects
are larger for the public sector (though not signiﬁcantly so), and remain insigniﬁcant for
the private sector (these results are not reported).
It is possible that people bribe to avoid oﬃcial payments: one focus group mentioned
this, although the bribe in question was paid to the local government oﬃcial issuing the
exemption certiﬁcate. However, most of the public sector bribes mentioned in the focus
groups had a diﬀerent purpose, which suggests that the causality may be the opposite:
health oﬃcials may attempt to extract bribes from the richer patients who need not pay
23For oﬃcial payments for which a receipt was given. The marginal eﬀect including receiptless payments
would be smaller.
13oﬃcially (because of the type of facility or because of their low income). This would be a
logical fund–raising response for local public oﬃcials whose oﬃcial fees are set centrally.
It is possible that local private hospitals likewise try to circumvent centrally imposed
exemption policies, or that in the private sector bribes are indeed paid principally to avoid
oﬃcial payment (less anecdotal evidence is available on private sector bribes). Patients
with respiratory and sexually transmitted diseases do not appear more likely to bribe in
the regressions, suggesting the purpose of the bribes is not to raise money from patients
whose care is paid for by the government (however, these patients appear more likely
than malaria patients to pay oﬃcial fees, raising the possibility that they are unaware
their care should be free and are paying unwitting bribes). Whatever the reason for the
private bribes by patients not paying oﬃcial payments, the procedure diﬀers from that in
the public sector, as the richer patients are not those paying the bribes.
4.2 Amount of bribe
For Peru, (log) household consumption has an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the (log) amount of
the bribe, but standard errors in the range 0.3–0.5 mean that little can be learned from the
small Peruvian sample of bribes. In Table 10 panel A I examine the determinants of the
amount of the (log) bribe in Uganda. The preferred speciﬁcations are those in columns 3
and 6 with the maximum covariates: in the public sector, the income (expenditure)
elasticity is 0.37, while is is only 0.15 in the private sector. The rich pay more than the
poor in both sectors, but pay a lower share of their expenditure, since the elasticity is less
than one. These elasticities compare with elasticities of 0.25–0.33 for pooled oﬃcials in
Hunt and Laszlo (2007): once again, competition from the private sector does not appear
to reduce price–discrimination in the public sector. If the panel A regressions are repeated
for patients making no oﬃcial payments, the (unreported) elasticities are similar.
Panel B shows that the income (expenditure) elasticity for oﬃcial payments is essen-
tially the same as for bribes in the public sector, at 0.36, while the private sector elasticity
for oﬃcial payments is much higher than for private bribes, at 0.38. Public sector bribes,
14public sector oﬃcial fees, and private sector oﬃcial fees are extracted from payers in the
same way based on their expenditure. Only private sector bribes are extracted diﬀerently,
and are closer to a ﬂat–rate fee.
4.3 Discussion of Ugandan results
Together, Tables 8–10 suggest the following characterization of payments for health care in
Uganda. In the public sector, richer patients are considerably more likely to make oﬃcial
payments, presumably in part because of oﬃcial policies charging patients according to
ability to pay, and in part because richer patients demand more of services that are not
free. However, some rich patients are using free services, and some poorer patients not
making oﬃcial payments are willing to pay non–zero amounts, so health facilities are able
to induce these patients, particularly the richer ones, to make unoﬃcial payments. The
income (expenditure) elasticity for the bribe amounts is the same as for oﬃcial payment
amounts.
The private sector diﬀers in that almost everyone makes an oﬃcial payment, exemp-
tions are not based on household expenditure, and bribes appear to be ﬂat fees assessed on
the exempted. However, the income elasticity for oﬃcial payment amounts is the same as
for oﬃcial payments and bribes in the public sector. This could be a coincidence, or could
indicate that in all three cases the elasticity is determined by the same combination of fee–
for–service (and the rich demanding more expensive services) and price–discrimination.
Anecdotal evidence indicating that public sector bribes often consist of paying for supplies
is consistent with an important role for fee–for–service bribes.
If private–sector health facilities operate in more competitive environments than pub-
lic facilities, this would be an explanation for less frequent and lower–value private–sector
bribes, as well as the inability of the private facilities to price discriminate in bribes. How-
ever, the ability to price discriminate also depends on how well staﬀ can judge patients’
ability to pay, which is in turn inﬂuenced by staﬀ turnover, the distance patients travel
to the hospital and procedures for assessing patient eligibility for oﬃcial fee exemptions.
15A priori it is unclear whether private or public staﬀ know their patients better.
5 Conclusions
In both Peru and Uganda, richer patients are more likely to bribe in the public health care
system. A doubling of household consumption increases the Peruvian bribery probability
by 0.2–0.4 percentage points, compared to a bribery rate of 0.8%. A doubling of house-
hold expenditure in Uganda increases the bribery probability by 1.2 percentage points,
compared to a bribery rate of 17%, a larger absolute eﬀect than for Peru, but smaller in
percent terms. The income (expenditure) elasticity of the bribe amount is 0.37 in Uganda,
and insigniﬁcant in Peru (where the sample size is very small, however). In both Peru
and Uganda, the link between bribery and consumption or expenditure is similar to or
higher than the link for all oﬃcials pooled, despite the presence of competition from the
private sector which might be expected to weaken this link.
For Uganda, additional results combined with anecdotal evidence suggest that the
public sector health staﬀ extort bribes particularly from the richer among the patients
who oﬃcially need not pay. The amount of the bribe is then inﬂuenced by household
expenditure in the same way as oﬃcial charges in both the public and private sector,
probably through a combination of price–discrimination and fee–for–service. Although
private sector bribes are even more strongly associated with not making oﬃcial payments,
the mechanism works diﬀerently. Those exempted in the private sector have similar
household expenditures to those not exempted, and appear to pay close to a ﬂat–rate
bribe.
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19Data Appendix
Peru – Encuesta Nacional de Hogares
The data are available at www.inei.gob.pe/srienaho/English/Consulta por Encuesta.asp.
The 2002 survey was taken in October, November and December of 2002. The “2003”
survey was taken from May 2003 to April 2004. One quarter of the 2003 households
were also interviewed in 2002. I simply combine monetary values from surveys taken
at diﬀerent times with no adjustment for inﬂation or seasonality, which tests indicated
was appropriate for household consumption. Household consumption is computed by the
statistical agency, based on the survey’s 31 pages of questions on household expenditure
and consumption.
The twenty–one types of oﬃcial listed in the survey are: municipal (city) government,
social security (providing social insurance other than pensions), state banks, judiciary,
drinking water, telephone, electricity, state schools, arbitration, Ministry of Agriculture,
Ministry of Industry, tax/customs authority, state hospitals, national civil identiﬁcation
registry, Department of Migration, police, electoral oﬃce, electoral court, development
agency, food agency, and “other”.
Uganda – Second National Integrity Survey
The survey was conducted in 55 of 56 districts of Uganda. The subsequent non–random
sampling of sub–counties led to the sub–county of the district headquarters always being
chosen, which means that urban areas are over–sampled. The district’s sub–counties were
divided into three categories based on availability of government services and infrastruc-
ture, and 20% of sub–counties in each category were randomly chosen. Within each of
these sub–counties, the local council 1 areas were similarly divided into three categories,
and one local council 1 area per category was chosen randomly. The selection of which
households to interview within these local council 1 areas did not appear to be random,
as it appeared to involve choosing households near the residence or oﬃce of the local
council 1 chairperson.
It is not possible to distinguish between zeroes and missing values in the components of
expenditure, so I simply assign zeroes to all missing values and sum the nine components.
For seven components, most of the values are missing. In the health module, there
are some valid responses for households who had not used the health care system in the
previous three months: I drop these observations. Also, some households gave information
on more than one health care visit in the previous three months (contrary to the survey
instructions): I retain only one visit per household.
The twenty–two agencies listed in the survey are: local primary school, Department
of Education, health unit, police, traﬃc police, local council 1, local council 3, Agri-
culture Department, Veterinary Department, Fisheries Department, Forestry Depart-
ment, Department of Cooperatives, Public Service (pensions), Water Department, Land
Board, Magistrates Court, Ugandan People’s Defence Force, Local Defence Force, Uganda
Revenue Authority (licencing), Uganda Revenue Authority (customs, anti–smuggling),
20Uganda Electricity Board and “other”. However, the variable for whether or not the
household used “other” oﬃcials is missing from the data I have received.
21Table 1: Health and health care in Peru and Uganda 
 
  Peru  Uganda 
  Year  Value  Year  Value 
Life expectancy at birth - males  2004  69  2004  48 
Life expectancy at birth - females  2004  73  2004  51 
Share population 15-49 HIV positive  2003  0.5  2003  4.1 
Share births attended by skilled personnel  2004  71.1  2000  39.0 
Doctors per 1000 pop  1999  1.17  2004  0.08 
Nurses per 1000 pop  1999  0.67  2004  0.61 
Health spending as % GDP  2003  4.4  2003  7.3 
Government spending as % total health spending  2003  48.3  2003  30.4 
 
Source: WHO http://www3.who.int/whosis/core/core_select.cfm 
 Table 2: Means of Peruvian variables from modules other than health 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  All  Bribery episode 
Bribery episode  0.0077  1 
Household consumption,  









Household problem previous 12 mths: 





         member sick or had accident  0.068  0.126 
         fire in apartment, shop, property  0.002  0 
         crime (robbery, assault etc.)  0.039  0.063 
         natural disaster  0.066  0.074 
Child born to household previous 12 mths  0.14  0.14 








Observations                                       12,262  95 
Amount of bribe, in US $ (if reported)  --  9.10 
(15) 
Observations  --  76 
 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The unit of observation is a household that in the 
bribery module reported using state hospitals.  
 Table 3:  Means of Peruvian bribery respondent health characteristics 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  All  Bribery episode 
Current:        
                no health insurance  0.74  0.83 
                chronic health condition  0.25  0.36 
Previous 12 months:  









                surgery  0.03  0.07 
Preventative consultation previous 3 months:      
                family planning (women 15-49)  0.10  0.13 
                vaccination program  0.06  0.06 
                iron supplement (pregnant, child 0-2)  0.01  0 
                health campaign  0.03  0.03 
                promotion of healthy practices  0.02  0.04 
Previous 3 months:  





                opthalmological services  0.03  0.02 
                any other medical goods/services  0.08  0.08 
Previous 4 weeks:  





                 medicine  0.43  0.53 
                 tests  0.06  0.12 
                 X-ray  0.01  0.05 
                 other procedures  0.02  0.04 
Observations  12,262  95 
 
Notes:  Standard  deviations  are  in  parentheses.  The  unit  of  observation  is  a  household  whose 
respondent  reported  using  state  hospitals  in  the  bribery  module.  Examples  of  “other  medical 
goods/services” are thermometer, orthopedics. Possible chronic health conditions mentioned in the 
survey were arthritis, hypertension, asthma, rheumatism. 
 Table 4: Means of variables related to health issues in previous four weeks - Peru 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  All  Bribery episode 
Health issues previous 4 weeks: symptoms  0.37  0.43 
                         Illness  0.27  0.29 
                         relapse of chronic condition  0.08  0.09 
                         Accident  0.01  0.02 
                         Pregnancy  0.02  0 
                         none of above  0.37  0.26 
Went to health center/hospital/doctor/clinic about 
previous month’s health issue 
0.25  0.33 
Most qualified health professional seen for previous 
month’s health issue if went to health center etc:            







                         Doctor  0.180  0.253 
                         Dentist  0.002  0 
                         Nurse  0.040  0.053 
                         Paramedic  0.006  0 
                         Pharmaceutical sales rep  0.001  0 
                         Other  0.005  0.021 
Health procedures for previous month’s health issue if 
went to health center etc:  







                         Medicine  0.228  0.284 
                         X-ray  0.013  0.053 
                         Other  0.019  0.042 
Observations  12,262  95 
 
Notes:  Standard  deviations  are  in  parentheses.  The  unit  of  observation  is  a  household  whose 
respondent reported using state hospitals in the bribery module. The symptoms dummy equals one 
if the respondent said s/he had “symptoms or discomfort (cough, headache, fever, nausea)”. The 
illness dummy equals one if the respondent said s/he had “illness (flu, colitis etc)”. Questions about 
the place where care was sought were asked of those who said they had had one of the listed health 
issues. Questions about health professionals and procedures were asked of those who responded 
that they had sought care at a health center, hospital, doctor’s or clinic. More than one answer was 
permitted for the health professional, but I ranked them in the order given and assigned a unique 
indicator for the highest qualified professional the respondent saw. Additional Peruvian means are 
given in Appendix Table 1. 
 Table 5: Ugandan health unit users in past three months 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 








A. Public           
All  0.17  0.38  --  --  4104 
Bribe reported  --  --  6.06 
(15) 
--  697 
Bribe or official 
payment reported 
--  --  --  11.66 
(59) 
1550 
B. Public hospitals           
All  0.19  0.41  --  --  2350 
Bribe reported  --  --  7.88 
(18) 
--  449 
Bribe or official 
payment reported 
--  --  --  15.81 
(74) 
973 
C. Private           
All  0.11  0.83  --  --  3467 
Bribe reported  --  --  5.26 
(10) 
--  398 
Bribe or official 
payment reported 




Note: Amounts in US dollars. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 Table 6: Ugandan health unit users in past three months 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Public sample  Private sample 
  No bribery  Bribery  No bribery  Bribery 
Household expenditure, 









Urban household  0.37  0.37  0.44  0.36 
Respondent no education  0.11  0.10  0.08  0.10 
Respondent 1-4 years edu  0.15  0.16  0.13  0.12 
















Patient illness:         
     malaria/fever/headache  0.62  0.61  0.70  0.68 
     pregnant/gynecological  0.07  0.09  0.03  0.04 
     intestinal/stomach  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
     respiratory  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.03 
Patient treatment:         
     single  0.54  0.48  0.54  0.53 
     part of course  0.44  0.49  0.43  0.46 
     other  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01 
Health facility:         
     public  1  1  0  0 
     private or other  0  0  0.91  0.96 
     mission  0  0  0.09  0.04 
Health facility:         
     hospital  0.53  0.58  0.14  0.06 
     health unit  0.28  0.24  0.44  0.54 
     dispensary  0.15  0.10  0.13  0.15 
     hospital + unit/dispens  0.03  0.06  0.02  0.03 
     pharmacy  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.03 
     clinic  0.01  0.01  0.22  0.17 
     drug store, other  0.00  0  0.01  0.01 
Observations  3407  697  3069  398 
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Additional Ugandan means are given in Appendix 
Tables 2 and 3. 
 Table 7: Peruvian state hospital users in past twelve months – who bribes? 
 















R-squared  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Basic  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Education, job  --  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other non-medical  --  --  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Symptoms, problems  --  --  --  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Insurance  --  --  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Hospital visited  --  --  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Hospitalized, surgery  --  --  --  --  --  Yes 
Professionals, tests  --  --  --  --  --  Yes 
 
Notes: Linear probability regressions for 12,262 observations with t-statistics in parentheses. The 
unit of observation is the household. All regressions include 24 regional dummies interacted with a 
dummy for the 2003 survey, nine household size dummies, town size dummies, time to the district 
administrative center (basic covariates).  Education is years of education; job dummies are dummies 
for  whether  the  respondent  is  a  doctor,  nurse  or  medical  technician.  The  other  non-medical 
covariates are the number of visits and dummies for respondent sex and age, and the presence of 
children. 
 Table 8: Ugandan users in past three months – who bribes, who pays? 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Public sample  Private sample 
A. Bribe             












R-squared  0.08  0.10  0.11  0.06  0.07  0.10 
B. Official payment             












R-squared  0.08  0.08  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.14 
Observations  4104  3467 
Basic covariates  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Education, job  --  Yes  Yes  --  Yes  Yes 
Other covariates  --  --  Yes  --  --  Yes 
 
Notes: Marginal effects from probits in columns 1-3, linear probability coefficients in columns 4-6. 
All regressions include 54 district dummies, 13 household size dummies, and an urban dummy (basic 
covariates).  Education  is  captured  by  dummies  and  job  refers  to  dummies  for  respondent 
occupation and the main source of household income. The other non-medical covariates are the 
number of household males and females over 18, respondent sex, age and age squared, and status as 
head or spouse. The other medical covariates are the patient age, dummies for patient illness, type of 
facility, ongoing versus once-off treatment, and (in columns 4-6) a dummy for a mission facility. 
 Table 9: Bribes and official payments among Ugandan health care users (%) 
 
  Public  Private 
  No bribe  Bribe  All  No bribe  Bribe  All 
78    22    100  45    55    100  No official payment 
  58    81      9    83   
92    8    100  98    2    100  Official payment    42    19      91    17   
All    100    100      100    100   
 Table 10: Ugandan bribers – log amount of bribe, log amount of official payment 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Public sample  Private sample 
A. Bribe             












R-squared  0.24  0.27  0.37  0.30  0.37  0.51 
Observations  697  398 
B. Official payment     












R-squared  0.26  0.28  0.40  0.23  0.25  0.36 
Observations  1550  2868 
Basic covariates  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Education, job  --  Yes  Yes  --  Yes  Yes 
Other covariates  --  --  Yes  --  --  Yes 
 
Notes:  Linear  probability  coefficients  with  t-statistics  in  parentheses.  All  regressions  include  54 
district dummies, 13 household size dummies, and an urban dummy. Education is captured by 
dummies and job refers to dummies for respondent occupation and the main source of household 
income. The other non-medical covariates are the number of household males and females over 18, 
respondent sex, age and age squared, and status as head or spouse. The other medical covariates are 
the patient age, dummies for patient illness, type of facility, ongoing versus once-off treatment, and 
(in columns 4-6) a dummy for a mission facility. 
 Appendix Table 1: Means of further Peruvian covariates 
 
  All households  Households reporting 
bribery episode 
Household member is: doctor  0.004  0 
         Nurse  0.011  0.032 
         Medical technician  0.001  0 
Bribery respondent sex (female=1)  0.54  0.51 
Household contains child aged: 0-3  0.35  0.34 
          4-7  0.37  0.34 
          8-11  0.38  0.26 
          12-15  0.34  0.23 








Town >500,000  0.13  0.11 
Town 100,000-500,000  0.24  0.24 
Town 50,000-100,000  0.06  0.09 
Town 20,000-50,000  0.08  0.08 
Town 2000-20,000  0.08  0.06 
Town 500-2000  0.06  0.01 
Town about 200  0.26  0.26 
Town about 100  0.09  0.14 
Year=2003  0.71  0.52 
Observations                                       12,262  95 
 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The unit of observation is a household that in the 
bribery  module  reported  using  state  hospitals.  Unlisted  household  level  variables  used  are 
departmento (region), year=2003.  
 
 Appendix Table 2: Means of Ugandan household main income source and respondent occupation 
 
  Public sample  Private sample 
  No bribery  Bribery  No bribery  Bribery 
Farming – cash crops  0.16  0.15  0.12  0.16 
Farming – foods crops  0.25  0.25  0.18  0.19 
Farming – livestock  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02 
Manufacturing, crafts, repair  0.06  0.09  0.07  0.09 
Trade - petty  0.09  0.07  0.09  0.09 
Trade – retail/shop/stall  0.10  0.11  0.15  0.15 
Trade – wholesale, crop buying  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.02 
Government – salaried or wage  0.12  0.10  0.10  0.08 
Private – salaried or wage  0.05  0.04  0.08  0.06 
Stipends from relatives  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.00 
Casual work  0.08  0.11  0.07  0.10 
Other  0.05  0.03  0.06  0.05 
Farmer – mainly crops  0.37  0.38  0.26  0.33 
Farmer – mainly livestock  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02 
Trader  0.18  0.19  0.25  0.21 
Civil servant/armed forces  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.03 
Teacher  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.04 
Professional in private practice 
(doctor/lawyer) 
0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03 
Craftsperson 
(carpenter/mechanic etc) 
0.06  0.07  0.07  0.08 
Casual laborer  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.08 
Housewife  0.10  0.09  0.10  0.10 
Student  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01 
Tailor/builder  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Bodaboda or taxi driver  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02 
Repair and service jobs  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.04 
Unemployed  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01 
Retired  0.00  0.00  0.00  0 
Observations  3407  697  3069  398 
 Appendix Table 3: Means of Ugandan patient illnesses 
 
  Public sample  Private sample 
  No bribery  Bribery  No bribery  Bribery 
Malaria/fever/headache  0.62  0.61  0.70  0.68 
Diarrhea  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.05 
Injury  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.05 
Pregnant/gynecological  0.07  0.09  0.03  0.04 
Immunization  0.03  0.00  0.00  0 
STDs  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01 
Intestinal/stomach  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
Heart  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02 
Accident  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Dental  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01 
Ear/nose/throat/eye  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Skin  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Backache  0.00  0.00  0.00  0 
Bone  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Other diseases  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04 
Respiratory  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.03 
Tetanus, measles  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.01 
General check up  0.00  0.00  0.00  0 
Observations  3407  697  3069  398 
 
 
 
 
 